Loundon County (VA) Fire released its comprehensive investigative report on the Medowood Court fire that occurred on May 25, 2008. This fire resulted in seven of their members receiving injuries, four of which received significant burns. Chief Pozzo and Loudon County Fire should be commended for doing such an extensive review, and allowing the fire service to learn from this incident.
Click here for the video
All I can say is thank you, not only from a brother on the line but from a dispatcher point of view.
AlL I can say is wow. this is the stuff I come here for. Makes you think about all the factors and hazzards. Very scary to be honest. I hope everyone gets better and returns to work. That fire turned bad fast.
Well my first problem I see with this, and I know Im gunna piss people off but, the fact that there is a 3 minute and 56 second delay on the dispatchers part. Where Im from a dispatcher does not need to know if the fire is on the first or second floor. All she need was name address and call back number that is it. To me she asked way too many questions. Another problem I see is not knowing your response area and streets. Next MAJOR problem I have is Im guessing the driver without full PPE or SCBA on plus almost losing his balance and falling then popping a window on the unburnt side inwhich drawing the fire to the opening. Then a mayday was given and radio communications didnt stop. I know I have made some people mad but thats the problems I saw. We should all take this as lesson on all ends, from which size lines to pull to accountablity. Be safe good bless.
Don’t be fooled by the call takers quest for more info.
She had forwarded the call to another dispatcher (for dispatch) while she gathered more information that would then be accessed on the truck’s MDTs.
There was a (just under) 3 minute lapse between receiving the call and the dispatch.
Which btw still may be a bit too long!
Quote: The Report
“13:01:00 – The ECC received a 911 call reporting a structure fire at 43238 Meadowood Court. The caller indicated that the “house…is on fire.â€
13:01:59 – The Dispatcher on 6-Alpha transmitted a commercial structure fire assignment for the Ross Department Store; responding units assigned were assigned the tactical radio channel 6-Charlie. After processing the Meadowood Court call and forwarding it to the 6-Alpha dispatcher,one of the dispatchers continued to question what the caller was seeing and to determine whether anyone was home. The Dispatcher entered the caller’s answers into the CAD notes, which are visible to both personnel in the ECC and personnel in the field accessing CAD remotely.
13:03:56 – The Dispatcher on 6-Alpha transmitted a house fire assignment, with responding units assigned the tactical radio channel 6-Delta.”
End quote.
Oh ya, and it seems that the other “fire” call kind of caught them a bit short.
Quote: The Report;
“At some point, an off-duty Dispatcher contacted the ECC to inquire whether additional personnel were needed. The Supervisor authorized the off-duty Dispatcher to come in to assist; the Dispatcher reported to the ECC at 1330 hours.”
A few comments from someone who was there:
There does seem to be a dispatch delay, perhaps exacerbated by the fact that they were already dispatching a box assignment in the same area. More concerning is that information wasn’t clearly passed to responding units. I know procedural changes are taking place in communications to address these issues, but I don’t work there so I can’t provide solid information.
The not knowing response area and streets is partially because units were responding from farther away due to the other ongoing incident. The first due engine would normally have been fourth due. I don’t know my 4th due area that well, so if it’s not in the map book I might be in trouble.
I can’t/won’t defend the lack of PPE, or the radio discipline. These and other mistakes were made. However, part of releasing all the information is so people can see what went wrong and what went right, and hopefully avoid serious injury or worse to others in the future.
And, speaking for myself personally, comments like the ones posted above won’t piss me off. We admit that things went wrong, as I suspect they do on every call. I’m proud that LCFR has the guts to post it all out there, good, bad, and ugly. Thanks for taking the time to read and comment. Stay safe.
jeff
sdg
Well I feel one of the best ways of learning is to take a step back and take yourself out of the situation and watch another department operate. There are many lessons to learn here but in this business no matter if you have 4 months on the job or 40 years you are always learning. Im glad that we have a website such as this one were we can all come together from different areas and different parts of the country/world and learn from each others mistakes. So in conclusion we can always learn from each other. Keep up to the good work and be safe god bless.
A question to the group, and again I am not 2nd guessing any one. If you arrive with a crew of three with a request for a primary search do you take all three to search or leave the operator/driver whatever you call him to do his job? How about the placement on this job, I think I would try and be a bit more on the A/B or A/D corner with the rig at least set up ASAP. Lots of good comments keep it up.
First off, thanks to the Chief and all of those with Loudoun County for having the stones to share this with the rest of us.
After watching the video and reading part (not all) of the 210 page report, I have taken a special interest regarding some of the recommendations made from the committee. The comments I will make is how I can learn from this incident to help improve the department I work for and the recommendations I will be taking to the union’s health and safety committee, the training division and anyone else who will listen. One of the key issues with the department I work for is dispatch. I see a need for improved SOG’s regarding “Mayday” incidents and radio traffic. The other big issue I see in the recommendations is staffing. When I first came on with the city 20 years ago, we had 5 people assigned to a truck. Over time it has dropped to 4 and over the last few years minimum manning is 3 per apparatus ( per contract). This is unacceptable but with the budget cuts occuring how do we fight it?
j2brown thanks to you for not getting pissed off with some of the comments made. I don’t think Evan or anyone else who posts the obvious errors we see has any malice in mind. We are all here to learn from incidents such as this one so that we can hopefully prevent unecessary injuries/deaths in the future. Thanks to Jeff and Jimm for creating a site where we can all learn from each others mistakes.
Let us also not forget the not so obvious that j2brown mentioned regarding the commercial box alarm in this district striking just prior to this one and the fact that the first in would normally have been fourth due.
Watch the video, read the report, and think about how your department would deal with a similiar situation. From there, look for ways you can improve the department you work for…I will now step down off of the soapbox to give someone else the “floor”. FTM-PTB
OFD295 and others:
I never meant to imply that I thought anybody here was posting with malice. I think the folks here are more interested in learning than throwing stones, and I very much appreciate that.
Conversely if I gave the impression that I was blindly defending actions and/or upset, that wasn’t my intent. I’m just trying to learn from the incident and help everybody else do the same. Please continue with the comments, criticism, and whatever else helps us learn. I’ll try and answer/clarify anything that I can.
FYI for context on my perspective: I was the driver on the 3rd dispatched (5th arriving) engine. We arrived about 2 mins after the MAYDAY was called.
Also a point of “clarification”: The dispatched “first in” would have been 4th due, but the diverting units meant that the first arriving engine and tower were actually 2nd due, second arriving engine was (just guessing here) 5th due, first arriving squad was 2nd (maybe 3rd) due, third arriving engine and was 4th due, second arriving truck was 4th due, and fourth arriving engine was probably 5-6th due. As you can see conditions were ripe for confusion. However we have default assigned jobs based on arrival and I think that served us well here. The folks asking for directions on the radio were command units coming from other battalions/areas as well.
jeff
sdg
Well I watched the video and from what I saw and heard there was a point in my opinion that command should have pulled everyone out. When the interior crew asked for an exterior progress report because they had heavy smoke conditions inside, command advised that they still had fire blowing through the roof and right around that time smoke conditions started to get really bad. I believe that at that time command should have had the interior evacuated the structure and went to a defensive operation. Also I saw alot of 1- 3/4 used on this fire. 2.5’s and deck guns should have been rockin on this one. Just my two cents.
j2brown
There was never any implication (from my point of view) that you were upset or that you were blindly defending the actions taken; in fact, it was just the opposite. I understood your comments for what they were and as I mentioned earlier, I applaud your department for allowing the rest of us to see and learn from this incident. The was a situation that went bad quickly with brothers in harm’s way. All of us should take/find something out of this to help make sure we avoid repeating past mistakes. It is nice to hear from someone who was actually there to put more perspective on the situation that just a few minutes worth of video. My prayers are with the brothers who are still recovering and hopefully they will be able to return to full duty soon.
If I may just throw a point out. No one has spoke about the lack of recognition to the changing smoke conditions. You Hear the Chief report to the interior Engine 6 that it appeared they were Hitting the fire. The video does not show that. Obviously were he was standing it appeared that they were but, there was approx. 1 to 1.5 min. that the smoke clearly changed for the worse and continued to get worse until the collapse and Flashover that quickly followed. Just food for thought, we are missing what the Smoke is telling us. 9 times out of 10 the smoke will tell us what is about to happen, are we trained enough to interpert it.
Hey Tower 16, look up at the post that has my name by it. Says basicly everything you just said.
On a way more important note, can someone tell us how those 7 guys are doing, that is whats the most important part here is that everyone got out alive. So if anyone can give a status on those guys it would be great. Thanks and be safe god bless.
Of the 7 hurt, four were involved in the MAYDAY. Three are back on the job and one is still recovering at home. Of the other three, two are back and one is still out recovering.
@ OFD295 : Thanks for your kind words. My intent was to make the point that I wouldn’t be upset by whatever was said here, not to correct a misconception. Apparently failed miserably. It’s a good thing I don’t work in communications, and I don’t have to talk to the pump panel. Anyway, that’s not the important issue here.
Now, back to the important discussion….
jeff
sdg
As said before this should be a lesson to everyone on how fast a fire can change. My thoughts go out to the guys who are still recovering. Ill agree with Jay that the evacuation should have been a little sooner and Tower 16 you read my mind, The smoke condition changed quickly. That should have been a dead give away that the fire attack crew wasnt making it with the caliber handline they pulled. With that said we cant forget the basics. I hope everyone was taught to “read the smoke” at one time in their career with the fire service. I have to give credit to command for keeping his cool during the MAYDAY that shows great leadership. We all know there is nothing worse then having an officer losing his cool under pressure. We learn from mistakes and move on. Keep it simple and stay safe guys.
Gents,
Thoughts and prayers go out to all involved and still recovering. Looking at the conditions, hearing the transmissions, and reading the report really bring things into perspective. The only thing I may add,and it’s been said before, is an adage that was taught to me by some experienced firefighters. “We hurry out of the firehouse, and we hurry on the road, but when we get there slow the f*ck down and try to find out what is actually going on”. It is a tribute to all those involved and their training, and maybe some help from the Man above, that the outcome of this fire was not “more tragic”.
Stay safe.
It appears to me that there was no report from the rear. I could be wrong but thats what I can observe from the video. Reports from the rear are critical at the arrival of a PD fire. Because it would appear from the video that the fire is in the attic or 2nd floor extending to the attic. When it might have started on the 1st floor or maybe even the basement. In that case we would never want to go above the fire unprotected. I don’t want to “arm chair” this one, I wasn’t there.
Thank you for everyones comments. The report and the video are great learning tools but this discussion is the icing on the cake. Big thanks to Jeff and his department for sharing this with us. Our thoughts and prayers are with those injured and we wish them a speedy and full recovery. Stay Safe Brothers!
Thank you guys so much for posting this.
EGH RFB
Right or Wrong…..The breaking of the windows on the 2nd floor. I say wrong….its already venting from the roof. I totally agree with the above comments on the changing smoke conditions. When I saw the video for the first time…I said…time to get the f**k out. Great report and learning opportunity for many departments. Best wishes to those injured.
One of the first changes in our system after this incident was a specific guidance “from above” that all on scene reports from first in units will include a report from the rear. How this works in practice is usually the first in unit gives the same report they would have given (“Engine 99 is on the scene of a 1 story single family dwelling with light smoke showing from the eaves. We’ve got our own water supply”). followed by some form of “I’ll get back to you with more.” Then they’ll check the rear and come back with the rest of the report (“Engine 99 to Loudoun, conditions on side C are clear. We’ll be advancing a 1 3/4 inch line through the front door with a crew of 2”).
Manpower seems to be an issue across the country.
More FF’s means quicker handline deployment and other vital ops are being addressed on the fireground.
These guys were behind the 8 ball prior to their arrival and had to make quick decisions to make up time lost in fire growth and advancement.
To vent or not to vent. Tough choice here.
Occupants trapped??? We don’t vent the smoke stays low and they die….we get blamed for not beign aggressive adn getting to them. Take the windows and maybe they have a chance. Attic fires I always take the windows.
I asked why years ago and a very old salted chief said to me that many firemen have died becasue when they started pulling the ceiling teh attic lit up and had no place to go after it dropped down. If you take a few windows that bad smoke and heat will roll out the windows first before it rolls down on top of you.
Made sense.
I give great praise to the brothers on scene that made an aggressive push and to keeping the madness from ovewhelming everyone when the Mayday went out.
Allot to learn from this and plan on sharing it with others so that WE may live.
Stay Safe Brothers
anyone else have trouble viewing the video?
Something to watch from statter911.com
Loudoun County video requests: The video Loudoun County, VA put together to go with its report on the Meadowood Court fire has generated a lot of requests from around the country. If you are one of those who is looking for a copy, Deputy Chief Randall Shank says be patient. While the department doesn’t have a mechanism to copy and distribute so many discs, Chief Shank says they are working on setting up a way that you can download the video. We will keep you informed.
After watching the video and reading the report I am very concermed with going interior on a defensive fire. The fire was through the rear roof and shortly after through the main ridge vent on a newer constructed lightweight dwelling. Smoke conditions changed 10 fold from the first arrival of the truck, all of which indicated that the upper floors were going to flash without recognition of the impending problems by the Incident Commander.
There’s a lot that can be learned from this near tragedy. If any of you get a chance to take Dave Dodson’s “The Art of Reading Smoke” class (or bring him to your station to put on the class) I can’t encourage you enough. It, by far, has been the most useful class I’ve ever taken and would have been a huge help to those that were on this scene. The smoke told almost the whole story of what was going on in the house and where it headed.
Also, I have to commend the remarkable job those in on the Mayday did in getting themselves out. What a great example of level heads and fortitude.
why did they even try an interior attack?
Due to volume of fire,construction, and limited manpower, this seems to be a good fire to be in “marginal” conditions. Go in offensive mode, but set paramaters to evacuate if you can’t make a quick hit on it. It may have turned out better if 2 or more lines could have been placed in service ealier.
Also, the IC probably should have pulled those guys when the radioed for and exterior progress report. Not long after, that nasty smoke really started to boil from the second floor. Flashover was imminent, and they needed to go. I’ll echo the sentiments about reading smoke. Before mayday, that fire was telling you that it was about to get really nasty.
A lot of the problems experienced in Loudoun sound eerily familiar to me. I watched the video and read the full report…now I’m having all of the crews in my district do the same. I’m asking them: Could this happen to us? Are we prepared for a Mayday? What are the major causative factors in this incident? It is making for some great discussions and is a good learning experience for all of us. Bravo to Loudoun for publishing this. And to the guys that got hurt – your pain and suffering aren’t being wasted. Every department, large or small, should be reviewing this incident and taking a new look at their own operations. It will save lives for sure!
Download the video (WMV file) here:
http://loudoun.granicus.com/DownloadFile.php?view_id=30&clip_id=1093
Folks,
Thanks for all the comments on this incident. I was the incident commander on this fire. As you can imagine this was an incident that changed the way I do business and my life as a whole. In my almost 23 years in the fire service, this was by far my toughest day.
All of your comments about reading the smoke, watching the conditions, and maintaining situational awareness are spot on. Let me elaborate a little on some of the things that are hard to see on the video. Please remember it is only one perspective of the event.
1) Upon my arrival crews had been operating inside for 7 or so minutes. I could see the stream from their attack line coming out of the attic in several places. In the video, if you look close, you will see the stream and debris pushed up and coming back down. It appeared to me that they were getting to the seat of the fire. But, as some of you stated there was only one line operating
2) The second attack line was pulled and the crew was getting dressed at the front door when conditions changed
3) The second arriving command officer was moving to Side C (rear) when conditions changed. We had discussed the possible need to evacuate and go defensive, but I wanted a report on conditions from Side C. The MAYDAY was called as he walked around the side of the structure
4) All communications with the interior crew were very calm, there was no indication of urgency from the crews inside, until the MAYDAY.
5) After I gave the report on conditions from outside I turned to my command board to start getting accountability organized. When I turned back around conditions were very rapidly deteriorating.
6) Sounding evacuation tones was delayed, that was a conscious decision on my part. If we sounded the evac tones it would override ALL fireground communications. Since I was communicating with the crew that was trapped I made the decision to make a verbal announcement to evac the building and not impair my ability to talk with the crews inside for twenty or so seconds.
All of this happened in the span of four minutes. I went in Command at 13:13 and the MAYDAY was at 13:17. We had full accountability of the crews involved within 10 minutes of the MAYDAY.
Here is some advice I will give to all of you:
1) NOTHING is routine
2) Follow your accountability system, it works
3) Train your people in situational awareness on the fireground, reading conditions, doing a size-up, calling the MAYDAY, answering the MAYDAY, and command post operations
4) There are a million other lessons learned from this fire and every fire we run. Learn from them, don’t just say you read the reports…Actually read them and share the information and knowledge.
5) Use your critical incident stress management teams. A number of our guys were shaken up by this call. CISM works…
6) Support your local burn center and burn foundation. The brothers and sisters of the Washington, DC Firefighters Burn Foundation were true heroes. They had a person at the burn unit before the first helicopter landed, and left the burn unit after the last firefighter was released. They are AMAZING people.
The members of the department that were trapped are recovering well, all but one is back to work. The most severely injured, the Lieutenant from Tower-606, still has a long way to go. His burns were very severe, but he is one of the strongest people I know. He will recover and hopefully be back in the station soon.
I hope that each and everyone of you will share this information with your people.
Stay Safe,
Jon Starling
jstarling@sterlingfire.org
Thanks Chief Starling and the rest of Loundon County for the posting of the video and the explanantion to go with it. This is a very good, calm, peaceful discussion. Which is how it should be. Brothers helping brothers.
Glad to hear everyone’s doing okay.
Thanks again Chief.
Brotherhood above all.
Stay safe.
Just wanted to say thanks to all for the imformation in the video. As training officer it will be a lot of lessons to teach my brothers and how things can change so fast. Get well and stay safe…..